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Regime Change, Deferred: Regarding United States’ Foreign
Policy in Syria
Rosa Mazza–Hilway
Rosa Mazza-Hilway is a graduating senior majoring in Political Science with minors in English and
Philosophy. She is an attorney on the Mock Trial team at Seton Hall University. Post undergraduate, she plans
on attending law school, and is currently in the admission process. A United States Foreign Policy course
inspired her paper, which explores why the United States has failed to successfully pursue the deposition of the
Assad regime in Syria.

I

n 2011, President Obama proclaimed, “the
time has come for President Assad to step
aside” (“President Obama”). The question
then becomes: why has the United States
failed to act upon this declaration and been
unsuccessful in achieving regime change in Syria?
While there is evidence to suggest regime change
is the ultimate goal in Syria, there has been a lack
of action taken to facilitate the deposition of
Assad. In this paper, there will be an emphasis on
the policies and rhetoric that indicate the desire to
catalyze a shift in governmental power through the
disposal of the Assad regime. This approach will
conceptualize the attempt to prove the
discrepancies between the ideals of the United
States and the actions taken by the nation. A
historical approach will be employed to highlight
the main policies, statements, and events which
shaped the United States’ promotion of regime
change in Syria. This approach will be organized
by presidential terms, beginning with Obama’s
first term, moving to his second term, and
progressing towards Trump’s first term and the
current state of affairs. This paper will
consequently employ theories of foreign policy, to
explain the Syrian situation from a theoretical
standpoint. The theories of realism and liberalism
will be employed while the ideals of both
theoretical frameworks will be traced through
foreign policy decisions, policies, and actions.
Ultimately, these foreign policy theories will be
rejected as the determining factor in the United
States’ failure to pursue Syrian regime change.
This paper will argue that public opinion is the
most significant factor which has shaped United

States’ foreign policy in Syria. Ultimately, the
overwhelming public opposition to sustained
military intervention will be isolated as the
determining factor and analyzed in terms of
affecting the foreign policy decisions of both
President Obama and Trump. Numerous public
opinion polls will be presented to conceptualize
this phenomenon and explain the importance of
the factor in the development of foreign policy. It
will then be clear that public opinion is the answer
to the question of United States inaction involving
pursuing regime change in Syria.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Numerous political scientists have authored
articles offering possible explanations for the
inaction in U.S. foreign policy regarding regime
change in Syria. These academics acknowledge the
vast amount of evidence, which suggests foreign
policy interests of intervention to facilitate the
deposition of Assad. They highlight the
discrepancies between theory and rhetoric, to
underscore the inconsistency between the United
States’ goals and foreign policy initiatives with
instances of action which support these policies.
Trent Mota introduces the claim that the theory of
liberalism is responsible for the inconsistencies in
his, “The Syria Problem” (Mota). Mota attributes
the influence of liberalism as a theory of
international relations, to the lack of military
action taken in Syria. Specifically, he focuses upon
Obama’s rejection of sustained military
intervention in the Syrian conflict (Mota). Mota
attributes the lack of action in Syria, to the fear of
the Obama administration in incurring
16
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repercussions from direct military involvement.
Seyyed-Abdolhamid Mirhosseini’s argument in his
“Discursive double-legitimation of (avoiding)
another war in Obama's 2013 address on Syria”
similarly expands on this argument, unpacking the
extent of the inaction in Syrian foreign policy
(Mirhosseini). His argument also focuses on the
policies of the Obama administration in
conjunction with a discussion of liberalism.
Mirhosseini discusses the influence of liberalism
upon the Syrian conflict and U.S. foreign policy.
Specifically, his paper focuses on the discrepancies
between the realist rhetoric of President Obama in
comparison to the liberal policies and actions
which were enacted (Mirhosseini). Both authors
analyze the prescriptions of liberalism and their
effects on foreign policy, describing the basic
ideological claims which conflict with the
possibility of regime change.
A large consensus in the literature attributes
the survival of the Syrian regime to internal
factors, such as the lack of opposition toward
Assad’s rule as well as the inability for successful
protests against the regime. Elie Elhadj is one
writer who supports this claim as he articulates in
his article, “Why Syria’s regime is likely to survive”
(Elhadj). Elhadj acknowledges the necessity for a
successful protest and rebellion period in order to
catalyze a change in regime. He maintains that this
necessary factor is unlikely to occur in Syria,
presenting evidence that Syria will not experience
a change in government (Elhadj). He cites the
willingness of Syria’s security forces, or the Alawi
community, to kill demonstrators in order to put
down protests, as an example of the lack of
possibility for a successful anti-regime movement
(Elhadj). Daniel Byman’s article, “Regime Change
in the Middle East: Problems and Prospects”
presents a similar argument (Byman). Byman
focuses on locating the differences between the
Syrian situation when compared to other Arab
countries with corrupt regimes. He identifies the
ever-growing number of protests and protesters in
Syria against external influence (including regime
change) as one of the main factors (Byman).
Specifically, Byman argues the demonstrations’
tendency to end in mass murder as one of the
factors that makes the Syrian situation more
distinct. His ultimate argument is that regimes,

such as Syria’s, will be sensitive towards any
foreign policy steps that might delegitimize their
government (Byman). Bassam Haddad also
reaches a similar conclusion in his article, “Syria’s
Stalemate: The Limits of Regime Resilience”
(Haddad). Haddad acknowledges the desire for
regime change in the United States among other
countries, but looks to the internal opposition in
Syria to explain the reasons for delay. He
maintains that the anti-intervention camp has
grown due to the very possible reality that foreign
military intervention would lead to total war
(Haddad).
Using a broader perspective, Nesam McMillan
and David Mickler introduce the doctrines of the
Responsibility to Protect and the International
Criminal Court as explanations for the
inconsistencies in regime changes, in their article
“From Sudan to Syria: Locating ‘Regime Change’
in R2P and the ICC” (McMillan, Nesam and David
Mickler). They propose that the inaction
surrounding regime change in Syria, stems from
the broader legal and political uncertainties of
regime change in general. What constitutes
legitimate regime change is the first question
identified. The second major question concerns
the relationship between traditions associated with
sovereignty and global humanitarianism
(McMillan, Nesam and David Mickler). Nesam
and Mickler further attribute these discrepancies
and questions the vagueness inherent in the R2P
doctrine and the ICC statute. The ambiguity is also
charged as the cause of problems in the practice of
regime change, as well as for the legitimacy of the
new government/ governing institutions. The
incoherence in the doctrines, as well as the
inability to reconcile the ambiguous doctrines
between themselves, is further cited to explain the
difference between past regime changes and Syria’s
current situation (McMillan, Nesam and David
Mickler).
Randa Slim proposes a different analysis of the
Syrian situation, in her article, “Hezbollah and
Syria: From Regime Proxy to Regime Savior”
(Slim). She looks to the longstanding ties between
Hezbollah and the Syrian elite, specifically the
House of Assad, in order to explain the United
States’ policy, or lack thereof, regarding regime
change (Slim). Slim argues that Hezbollah’s
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immense presence in the region acts as a deterrent
for the United States to pursue direct military
action. The administration must consider the
possible repercussions of waging war with Syria
and Hezbollah, as unintended consequences of
military action in Syria (Slim).
Jason Brownlee, in his piece “…And Yet They
persist: Explaining Survival and Transition in
Neopatrimonial Regimes” introduces the
argument of patrimonial authority and the
strength to resist regime change, which is inherent
in some governments (Brownlee). He uses the
variable “hard-liner” strength to measure the
relationship between certain regimes and foreign
influence (Brownlee 36). Utilizing the case studies
of Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Tunisia, Brownlee
concludes that the endurance of the regimes can
be attributed to the ability of authoritarian
incumbents to underscore opposition movements,
when unimpeded by foreign influence (Brownlee).
Therefore, Brownlee attributes the success of
regime changes to an undermined patrimonial
network. Because Syria’s patrimonial regime has
flourished, despite foreign efforts, Brownlee argues
the regime can and will continue to sustain itself,
excluding the possibility of regime change efforts
by the United States (Brownlee).
UNDERSTANDING THE SYRIAN SITUATION
The 2011 Arab Spring uprisings led to the
beginning of the conflict in Syria, as antiauthoritarian forces advocating for the adoption of
democracy formed in countries across the Middle
East (Al Jazeera). In Syria, the formation of antiAssad rebel groups addressed the crippling
economy as well as the lack of freedom and human
rights under the dictatorship. The Assad regime
responded to the democratic movements, with
violence, destruction, and the abuse of human
rights (Al Jazeera). The formation of the leading
anti-Assad rebel group, the Free Syrian Army, led
to the rise of tensions between the government and
rebel groups, resulting in the Syrian Civil War (Al
Jazeera). The initial civil war has evolved into a
large-scale conflict involving international powers,
religion, terrorism, and humanitarian crises. The
creation of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
are examples of the extreme response to the
conflict and destruction between the Syrian rebel

forces and the Syrian government (Al Jazeera).
Currently, the extent of the United States’ military
intervention in Syria is solely focused on
destroying ISIS, removed from the pursuit of
regime change or shifting the balance of power in
the region (Al Jazeera).
The United States’ primary motivation for
supporting Syrian rebel groups is the promotion of
democracy and the destruction of authoritarian
regimes, specifically Assad’s rule in Syria (“Syrian
Civil War.”). The United States was founded on
core democratic beliefs such as sovereignty,
liberty, and freedoms- rights which are secured
within the Constitution. The inherent liberalism of
the nation emphasizes the desire for promotion of
rights and liberties, through the practice of
democratic promotion. In response to the
depravation of rights and corrupt authoritarian
governments in other countries, the United States
has championed democratic promotion (through
processes ranging from securing free elections to
the installation of new democracies) (Stuster). The
United States has supported other rebel groups
and facilitated the regime changes in other
countries involved in the Arab Spring uprisings,
including Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Yemen. In a
broader analysis of the world, the United States
has overseen the military coups of other
governments throughout history (Stuster). Some
of these countries include Brazil, Chile, the Congo,
the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Iran, and
South Vietnam. While many of these instances of
political intervention were carried out through
covert CIA operations, the United States has a
proven pattern in regards to deposing of brutal
dictatorships and installing pro-American,
democratic governments (Stuster). Since the
operations, the United States has taken credit and
publicly acknowledged the actions and
depositions, ultimately championing the spread of
democracy and rights (Stuster). This historical
precedent paved the way for the United States’
intervention in the Syrian civil war and in
deposing the Assad regime.
The Syrian civil war has sparked action from
the international community, including
international organizations such as the UN, as well
as other countries. The regime’s violence against
its citizens has prompted not only the United
18

POLITICAL ANALYSIS · VOLUME XIX · 2019

States, but the United Nations to impose
punishments upon the country (“Syrian Civil
War.”). International interference has been
necessary to respond to the imprisonment, torture,
and murder of protesters, as well as the use of
chemical weapons against civilians in Syria. The
international community has also responded
through the alliance with the rebel groups as well
as the Syrian government (“Syrian Civil War.”).
Specifically, the United States has provided
support, both politically and militarily, to the rebel
Syrian forces as a representation of its censure of
the dictatorship (“A Look at US Involvement in
Syria.”). Assad’s regime is supported politically
and militarily by both Russia and Iran. Groups
such as Hezbollah, ISIS, and the Russian army
have sided with Assad and supported the
government in the Syrian conflict (Al Jazeera).
While there are influences and opposing forces
within Syria, the international community and
external influences present in the region also
contribute to the totality of the conflict.
The humanitarian crisis in Syria further
constitutes a larger reason for the United States’
interference in the country, invoking the
Responsibility to Protect (“A Look at US
Involvement in Syria.”). The Responsibility to
Protect has been signed by numerous countries,
mostly those comprising the United Nations, and
constitutes a global commitment for aid in the face
of atrocities. The four key concerns that it
addresses include preventing genocide, ethnic
cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity (“Responsibility to Protect.”).
Ultimately, the doctrine is centered around
violations of human rights and mass atrocities.
While it is considered a measure of last resort, in
the face of a country in violation of any or all of
the four key concerns, action is seen as legally
required and permissible (“Responsibility to
Protect.”). Assad’s use of chemical weapons is a
direct violation of the key concerns of the doctrine,
warranting an international response.
Consequently, the United Nations has been an
active mediator in the Syrian crisis, and the United
States has followed suit in most situations, helping
to impose and enforce economic sanctions and
military intervention (“Syrian Civil War.”).
However, due to international disagreement,

larger scale intervention consisting of Syrian
occupation by multiple nations, has been
prevented. While R2P has been used to rationalize
regime change, for example in the case of Libya,
the doctrine has not been utilized effectively in
Syria (“Responsibility to Protect.”). In theory, the
doctrine could be used to justify larger- scale
military operations in Syria, in order to prevent
the mass atrocities and violations of human rights.
Because of the precedent of using R2P to justify
regime change, it is also quite possible to use the
doctrine to facilitate the deposition of Assad.
The United States has responded to the threats
of terrorism, specifically regarding ISIS and its
reign in Syria, through military intervention in
Syria. However, despite the numerous reasons
which would justify the forced removal of the
Assad regime, Assad’s dictatorship has survived.
THE PRESIDENCY OF BARACK OBAMA
Over the course of President Obama’s
presidencies, there were numerous factors which
suggested the United States’ foreign policy goal in
Syria was regime change. The Syrian conflict
peaked during his presidencies, in terms of actual
physical conflict, the international community’s
concern, public concern and media coverage (“The
Syrian Conflict”). There was a heightened sense of
expectancy for the President to exert his power
and influence over Syria in order to either resolve
the conflict or take action in order to mediate the
situation. Examples of the President’s own actions
and promises that would suggest regime change
include Obama’s protest for Assad to step down
from power, the declaration of his “red line”
doctrine, and the pursuit of military airstrikes on
the region (“A Look at US Involvement in Syria.”).
His own administration included many outspoken
influences in the creation of foreign policy, or
those advocating for the overthrow of the Syrian
regime. Despite these aspects of his presidencies
which suggested there would be a strong influence
pushing for regime change, very little action was
taken. While the United States did pursue punitive
measures upon the regime for the abuse of human
rights, the Obama administration exercised very
limited military intervention (“Foreign Policy of
the Barack Obama Administration.”). Obama’s
declared goal of regime change was very limitedly
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pursued during his administration and ultimately
left in the past after his presidential terms.
In 2011, leaders of numerous countries around
the world, including Angela Merkel of Germany
and David Cameron of the United Kingdom called
on Assad to resign from power in Syria. Barack
Obama followed suit and formally called on Assad
to “step down ‘for the sake of the Syrian people’”
(“Foreign Policy of the Barack Obama
Administration.”). The demand for Assad’s
resignation influenced public opinion and shaped
the official foreign policy agenda. In 2012, Obama
referred to Assad’s use of chemical weapons
against his own people as a “red line” (“A Look at
US Involvement in Syria.”). The “red line”
doctrine labeled the transportation or use of
chemical weapons by the Syrian government as
cause for military intervention by the United
States. The ultimatum acted as a threat of force to
the Assad regime, as the administration could
either cooperate and prevent further chemical
weapons attacks in Syria or refuse to submit and
face military consequences (“A Look at US
Involvement in Syria.”). Obama was pressured to
act on his “red line” doctrine in August of 2013,
following the chemical weapons attacks on rebels
in Damascus, resulting in the death of nearly 1,500
citizens (Mayer). Obama responded with a
proposal for limited military intervention, which
he presented before Congress. However, Obama
faced Congressional dissent, provoking him to
reevaluate his options, including military
involvement (Mayer). Presented with two courses
of action concerning the destruction of chemical
weapons in Syria: the first choice of utilizing
military force through airstrikes or the second of
pursuing diplomatic negotiations to more
effectively reduce the abundancy of chemical
weapons, Obama favored the second approach (“A
Look at US Involvement in Syria.”). While acting
in accordance with his “red line” doctrine would
have meant the pursuit of the first military
approach, Obama defaulted to the pursuit of
cooperation, going against his rhetoric which
suggested military involvement.
Under President Obama, the United States
began supporting the Free Syrian Army, or the
rebel forces opposed Assad’s dictatorship, another
example which suggest the United States’ desire to

conduct military operations in Syria (“A Look at
US Involvement in Syria.”). The objective of the
Free Syrian army was to depose Assad through
armed operations (“The Syrian Conflict”). The
army was largely constructed and supported by
foreign actors, including the United States.
Security officials from the United States, alongside
officials from other countries, facilitated the
election of military commanders and
representatives in the army (“Foreign Policy of the
Barack Obama Administration.”). Along with
elections, the United States sent officials to train
these officers in military strategies and tactics. The
Obama administration also provided weapons,
artillery and financial aid to the rebel groups
(“Foreign Policy of the Barack Obama
Administration.”). Later, the creation of the New
Syrian Army, a rebel group branching from the
Free Syrian Army, further presented an
opportunity for military intervention and regime
change in Syria (“The Syrian Conflict”). While the
forces eventually dissolved and formed the
Revolutionary Commando Army, many of the
commanders and soldiers of the army previously
received training from the United States’ military.
The United States’ role in supporting and leading
the opposition groups to Assad’s regime, would
suggest the United States’ goal was concurrent
with the rebel groups. The rebel groups specifically
formed in order to oversee the deposition of
Assad, meaning the United States recognized and
assumed this goal when military officials chose to
support the Free Syrian Army. However, while the
Obama administration took extensive measures to
ensure these groups would be prepared and
organized to prove effective in their opposition to
Assad, Obama never acted further upon regime
change.
Numerous notable officials comprising the
Obama administration advocated for military
intervention as an introduction to a more active
role for the United States in Syria, as they
attempted to facilitate Syrian regime change. One
of the strongest condemnations of the Assad
regime came from Obama’s Secretary of State,
Hillary Clinton (“Foreign Policy of the Barack
Obama Administration.”). Clinton advocated for
larger scale military operations in Syria during
Obama’s terms, and has continued to be a vocal
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proponent of sustained military intervention,
denouncing the legitimacy of the Syrian
government. Obama’s first two defense secretaries,
Robert M. Gates and Leon E. Panetta, heralded the
opposition to Obama’s retracted foreign policy,
arguing he was attempting to micromanage the
military (“Foreign Policy of the Barack Obama
Administration.”). They advocated for the greater
allowance of power to the military to carry out
operatives in Syria, to further advance the process
of deposing Assad. Obama’s third defense
secretary, Chuck Hagel, furthered this trend as a
vocal proponent of military attacks against Assad
(Bertrand). Hagel proposed numerous plans for
military strikes and intervention, which were all
consequently struck down by Obama (Bertrand).
Hagel was frequently recorded stating that the
United States was ready to take military action
once the orders were given, clearly indicating the
discrepancy between military personnel and the
Commander in Chief- President Obama
(Bertrand). Hagel objected to a mass ground
deployment, and instead argued for a limited
military engagement, in an attempt to persuade
even the non-interventionists aligning with
Obama (“Foreign Policy of the Barack Obama
Administration.”). He believed that even this
limited form of military action, which did not
require mass deployment of American troops,
could shift the balance of power against Assad and
towards the rebel groups (“Foreign Policy of the
Barack Obama Administration.”). He further
pursued two different options in order to facilitate
this change in power dynamics: arming the rebel
groups against Assad, or using military strikes
directed at the Syrian air force. Hagel argued either
option would facilitate regime change from Assad
to the rebel power groups, without requiring a fullscale invasion on behalf of the United States
(Bertrand). While these options were heralded by
Hagel and other advisors within the Obama
administration, the policies were rejected by the
President.
To understand the discrepancy between
President Obama and some of his most prominent
administrators, it is necessary to understand his
role in shaping foreign policy. Tony Badran, a
Middle Eastern researcher, explained the
overarching role President Obama played in

shaping foreign policy toward Syria. Badran
argues, “‘the US Syria policy has always been in the
head of one man, and one man only: Barack
Obama’” (Bertrand). He further explains Obama’s
intentions, arguing he “‘never intended to remove
Assad’”, explaining the United States’ foreign
policy as a reflection of this bias (Bertrand).
Obama exercised his assumed executive power, by
retaining the most influence in shaping American
foreign policy (Bertrand). While these officials
were influential components of Obama’s
administration, they were ultimately unsuccessful
in gaining the support of President Obama.
Obama’s rejection of simply entertaining the idea
of regime change, barred the existence of his
administrator’s opinions influencing his foreign
policy (Bertrand). This key factor explains the
discrepancy between the opinions of the personnel
comprising the Obama administration, and the
concrete policies of the United States (Bertrand).
However, the explanation of Obama’s use of noninterventionist policy despite the majority
opinions of his advisors and administration,
requires a more expansive understanding of the
role of liberalism in Obama’s determination of his
foreign policy ideals.
President Obama’s stance toward military
intervention and the pursuit of regime change in
Syria, was heavily influenced by the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan. The long-lasting wars, the
overwhelming commitment made by the United
States’ military in both of these countries, and the
long-lasting effects of the wars, shaped the United
States as a whole, not excluding the foreign policy
of the presidential administration (Woodward).
President Obama’s speech concerning military
strikes against Syria acknowledged these
precedents while reflecting upon the effects of the
conflicts. He explained his resistance towards
intervention as he had previously “resisted calls for
military action [in Syria] because we cannot
resolve someone else’s civil war through force” a
conclusion he came to “after a decade of war in
Iraq and Afghanistan” (Staff, Washington Post).
Using the hindsight acquired after the United
States’ invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, Obama
feared a military invasion of Syria would lead to a
similar situation in another Middle Eastern
country. He also reflected upon the mass casualties
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and sacrifices made by the U.S. military in Iraq
and Afghanistan, again understanding the
implications of the wars and failures (Woodward).
Due to this history, Obama was precise with his
actions and policies in order to prevent any
prolonged conflict as he promised the American
people he “[would] not pursue an open-ended
action like Iraq or Afghanistan” (Staff,
Washington Post). Regime change in Syria would
most definitely classify itself as “open-ended
conflict”, explaining the lack of action in that
regard, due to fear of intervention leading to war
(Staff, Washington Post). Therefore, Obama’s
subsequent foreign policy concerning the Middle
East was largely based on nonintervention. His
tendency to favor inaction over intervention later
extended to his foreign policy decisions in Syria.
Because President Obama could be described as a
liberal non-interventionist after the invasions of
Iraq and Afghanistan, the policies the United
States embraced during his presidency coincided
with the foreign policy theory of liberalism
(Woodward).
Liberalism helped shaped United States’
foreign policy during the Obama administration
emphasizing the sue of negotiation and
cooperation over the exercise of military power.
Regime change by the United States would require
a large-scale military invasion and sustained
intervention, or mass troop deployment. The
emphasis on power and military in either of these
situations, contrast with the ideals of President
Obama. While he responded to public pressure
when initiating his “red line” doctrine as well as
airstrikes in order to enforce his previous
assertions, he largely fell back from direct military
action or intervention “Foreign Policy of the
Barack Obama Administration.”). He repeatedly
argued that there was “no military solution” to the
Syrian conflict, continuing to advocate for a
diplomatic settlement between the international
powers (Mota).
The purpose of the declaration was to
immediately address the concerns of the
international community as well at the other
prominent interventionists in the president’s
administration. Obama’s true beliefs heralded
liberalism and its emphasis on non-military
answers. At the time in which he declared the “red

line’ in Syria, the only option available to President
Obama presented itself as the use of force to enact
punitive measures (“Foreign Policy of the Barack
Obama Administration.”). However, a few days
after Obama gave his ‘red line” speech, Russian
President Vladimir Putin, offered to negotiate
diplomacy between the United States and Syria
(Mayer). Obama weighed the two options at hand,
but ultimately chose to pursue diplomatic
negotiations alongside Putin and Assad. His
decision can largely be explained by the influence
of his subscription to liberalism. While there may
seem to be a discrepancy in the initiates of
president Obama in Syria, it is clear that once the
option of resolving the situation no longer
involved direct military aggression on behalf of the
United States, Obama was more inclined to agree
to the summits and treaties (Mayer).
The G20 Summit was held between Putin and
Obama to discuss the international control of
Syrian chemical weapons. On September 14 of
2013, the “Framework for the Elimination of
Syrian Chemical Weapons” was finalized and
published (“Foreign Policy of the Barack Obama
Administration.”). This international treaty
resulted from United States- Russian negotiations,
or a reliance on the international system, to
provide safety and security in Syria. This
document called for Assad to eliminate Syria’s
chemical weapons stockpiles by June of 2014
(“Foreign Policy of the Barack Obama
Administration.”). The United States also relied on
the power of the United Nations Security Council
and its resolutions, in order to achieve its goals
concerning the humanitarian crisis in Syria,
without pursuing regime change. The UN Security
Council Resolution 2118, stipulated that Syria
would assume responsibility for the destruction of
its chemical weapons as well as the chemical
weapons facilities. The UN laid out an
implementation plan requiring Syrian officials
adherence to time restrictions and guidelines
concerning the elimination of the administrations’
weapons (“Foreign Policy of the Barack Obama
Administration.”). The diplomatic negotiations led
to Syria’s introduction to the Chemical Weapons
Convention as well as Assad’s cooperation with
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons. The use of the international system and
22
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diplomatic negotiations further proves the
tendency for Obama’s ideals to align with
liberalism.
Liberalism’s emphasis on cooperation over the
use of military force or action, further explains
Obama’s decision to move from pursuing military
intervention in Syria to embracing more peaceful,
non-violent approaches. Obama supported
political and diplomatic negotiations, not only in
Syria, but these ideals were seen throughout his
foreign policy initiatives in other countries as well.
While the members of his administration arguing
for direct military intervention, subscribed to the
theory of realism, Obama’s liberal ideals directly
conflicted with the prescriptions of realism. This
explains why Obama chose the latter of his two
present options in shaping foreign policy in Syria,
as the negotiations coincided with a liberal
approach. The G20 Summit and the United StatesRussian led negotiations were both examples of the
utilization of the international system as well as
the liberal tendency to promote noninterventionism. Liberalism emphasizes the use of
international organizations and treaties, as these
institutions can be effectively utilized in order to
reduce anarchy in the international system. The
key concept of cooperation helps underscore the
importance of the use of these organizations, as
states’ actions can be mediated and manipulated
through the use of negotiations and diplomacy.
President Obama understood that the possibility
for peaceful negotiations was superior to military
intervention, as successful treaties would result in
a much larger reduction of chemical weapons in
Syria as opposed to inaccurate or potentially fatal
airstrikes (Mayer).
While Obama’s ideological preferences
regarding theories of foreign policy, can be
isolated as the contributing factor to preventing
the United States from pursuing regime change,
the case differs regarding Trump’s presidency.
Trump heralds the foreign policy theory of
realism, as he emphasizes the use of power and the
power dynamics inherent in the international
system. Due to the fact that Trump does not
subscribe to liberalism, there must be another
answer to explain the question of failure in
pursuing Syrian regime change.

THE PRESIDENCY OF DONALD TRUMP
While United States’ foreign policy under
President Obama was largely influenced through
his adherence to liberalism, it has adapted to
accommodate the ideals of President Trump. Due
to President Trump’s rejection of the theory of
liberalism, he subsequently rejects liberal non
interventionism, the policy which was hailed by
Obama during his presidencies. In opposition,
Trump’s foreign policy is largely characterized by
the theory of realism. Realism is the theory of
international relations which emphasizes national
interests, the role of the state and military power in
world politics. President Trump’s subscription to
this theory explains his emphasis on states as the
primary actors in the international system, his
rejection of international organizations and the
emphasis on hard power. While Trump’s realist
paradigm directly contradicts Obama’s liberal
paradigm, the policies of both administrations are
surprisingly similar with regard to the Syrian
crisis.
The Trump administration has been criticized
for the lack of written, concise policies regarding
the Syrian conflict (Krieg). While Trump has not
formally declared his objectives in Syria, “the
various foreign policy U-turns over the past four
months suggest that there is no U.S. global
strategy, let alone a strategy for the Middle East”
(Krieg 145). This indicates that there has not been
a clear strategy to which the Trump administration
has relied upon in its proceedings with Syria. An
explanation of this phenomenon relies upon an
understanding of Trump’s “America First” policy,
with its strict focus on domestic policies as
opposed to foreign policy has many implications,
specifically on the crisis in Syria (Krieg). This
policy is largely centered around the notion that
the United States must first solidify its strength at
home before it is able to shift its focus abroad. This
explains Trump’s focus on domestic policies in
areas such as economics and trade within these
first years of his administration. While many
believed that Trump’s repetition of “America
First” and “Make America Great Again” would
result in a strictly isolationist foreign policy,
Trump’s subscription to realism has prevented this
isolationist perspective (Krieg). While there is still
a lack of physical, written policy, Trump’s ideals
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can be inferred from his foreign policy
interactions.
Syrian foreign policy under President Trump
is focused upon two distinct goals. The first goal
concerns fighting and destroying the presence of
ISIS in the region, as well as crippling the entire
organization itself (Krieg). One of the few foreign
policy issues Trump addressed in his campaign for
President was ISIS, which he deemed his primary
foreign policy objective. The second goal the
administration has outlined is resolving the
chemical weapons violations of the Assad regime.
Many of the strikes against the Syrian government
have been to address this issue, provoking
international action as well (Krieg). Because the
Trump administration has only explored these two
goals in Syria, regime change has been completely
swept under the rug. The administration’s goals
are confined to the anti-terrorism and human
rights objectives, barring the existence of
conversation, let alone policy, regarding regime
change in Syria (Niva). Currently, terrorism is the
forefront issue, whether that changes in the future
due to successful attacks against ISIS, could
possibly change the current situation of the Assad
regime (Niva).
The Trump administration’s policies
regarding the United States military as well as the
ideals concerning power are in accordance with
Trump’s subscription to the foreign policy theory
of realism. Trump champions the use of hard
power, such as aggressive displays of military
might, and the use of threat. President Trump
emphasizes the importance of America retaining
its position as “the world’s preeminent military
power” (Popescu 98). In order to solidify this
position he has advocated for the “rebuilding and
modernizing” of the military which previously had
been obstructed by Obama’s liberal leanings
(Popescu 98). Trump has called for an increase in
military spending, in order to continue the buildup of the army. The budget for defense spending is
one of the largest allocations of spending money
the military has ever seen (Popescu). Trump is a
firm believer in the existence of an expansive, wellmaintained military, and the large amount of
spending devoted to the military will allow for the
solidification of power and ability. This action not
only acts as a display of power, but its shifts the

balance of power in favor of the United States
when compared to the Islamic State, as the U.S.
has more military might (Popsecu).
Trump’s emphasis on power can also be seen
through the increased military strikes in Syria.
“Conventional bombing and drone strikes have
significantly increased under Trump” with the goal
of targeting and eradicating ISIS from the region
(Niva 3). President Trump’s policy concerning
Syria is often referred to as “annihilation tactics”
due to the large-scale attacks as well as the
frequency of these military strikes (Niva 3). Trump
has already dropped a record number of bombs on
the Middle East, specifically Syria, increasing by
roughly 10 percent when compared to his
predecessors (Niva). The two major airstrikes
conducted under the Trump administration to
date, were the April 2017 and April 2018 attacks.
In April 2017, the United States received
reports of chemical weapon attacks in Douma,
Syria. The reports showed signs of exposure to
chlorine and sarin gas, resulting in the death of
dozens of civilians, including women and children
(“Syrian Civil War.”). While Syria and Russia
denied any involvement in the attack, the
horrifying images and casualty reports from the
attacks provoked an international response
(“Syrian Civil War.”). The importance of the
chemical attack was underscored due to the
Obama administration’s diplomatic efforts
alongside Russia to shut down the weapons
facilities and destroy the remaining chemical
weapons in Syria. The ability of the Assad regime
to carry out the attacks emphasized the failure of
the previous administration to hinder Assad’s
chemical weapons power, or to successfully deter
his further actions (“Syrian Civil War”). Trump
recognized these discrepancies, catalyzing his
decision to resort to the exercise of military power.
On Friday, April 7 of 2017, the Trump
administration delivered multiple attacks in
response to the use of chemical weapons by the
Assad regime (“Syrian Civil War.”). The targets of
the missiles were associated with the chemical
weapons program of Syria, including a scientific
research center as well as a chemical weapons
storage facility. The United States fired 59 TLAMs,
or Tomahawk cruise missiles at these facilities and
in the specific areas in order to emphasize the
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objective of the attacks as well as create the most
possible consequences for Assad concerning his
violation of international law (“Syrian Civil War”).
On April 14th of 2018, the United States alongside
France and the United Kingdom, launched more
airstrikes against the Assad regime in response to
subsequent chemical weapons attacks on Syrian
civilians (“Syrian Civil War.”). The reports
detailed a chemical attack on a Damascus suburb.
Once again, the attack zones were limited to those
associated with the construction, development, or
holding of chemical weapons (“Syrian Civil
War.”).
The military strikes conducted by the United
States on the Assad regime were defended on the
basis of two objectives of intervention. The first
objective was to impose a punishment on the
Assad regime for the chemical weapons attacks.
The second objective was to deter Assad from
using chemical weapons once again in future
attacks. Trump was determined to strategically use
the strikes to impair Assad’s ability to continue
producing chemical weapons, as well as possibly
prevent him from exercising future attacks upon
his civilian population (“
Syrian Civil War”). He vocalized these goals in an
address to the public which he stated that the
attacks were carried out in order “to establish a
strong deterrent against the production, spread
and use of chemical weapons” by the Assad regime
(“Statement by President Trump on Syria”). The
second round of airstrikes carried out in 2018,
were designed to inflict much more damage than
the 2017 attacks, due to Assad’s persistence in the
usage of chemical weapon warfare (“Syrian Civil
War”). The increased use of missiles reflects this
change in attitude, as the attacks were no longer
solely for the purpose of installing fear at the
hands of a threat, but to cripple Assad’s forces.
However, the strikes were limited in their
objectives, to focusing upon the use of chemical
weapons in Syria. The strikes were not designed or
carried out to facilitate the deposition of Assad, or
even to aid the rebel groups against the regime.
The strikes, in theory, and in practice, were
targeted to answering the question of chemical
warfare and providing repercussions for the Assad
regime.

When commenting on the extent of the
United States retaliation against the Assad regime,
Trump contended that the United States would be
“prepared to sustain this response until the Syrian
regime stops its use of prohibited chemical agents”
(“Statement by President Trump on Syria”). When
asked if the United States through the Trump
administration would pursue any further action in
Syria after the military strikes, Defense Secretary,
Jim Mattis, focused his answer on the subsequent
actions of the Assad regime. He stated that the
United States’ future actions would “depend on
Mr. Assad should he decide to use more chemical
weapons in the future” (“Briefing by Secretary
Mattis on U.S. Strikes in Syria.”). These answers
reveal two very significant factors in
understanding the foreign policy initiatives of the
Trump administration regarding Syria. The first
factor is the focus on the chemical weapons issue
in Syria. The second is the reactive policy, as
opposed to a proactive foreign policy. Because the
goals of the administration are clearly aligned and
have been specifically highlighted, it is possible to
understand the lack of U.S. military action
regarding Syrian regime change. The Trump
administration is not attempting to pursue
military action to provoke regime change, but
rather to punish the Syrian government for the
violation of human rights through the chemical
weapons attacks against Syrian citizens.
While the Trump administration has not shied
away from pursuing military intervention and
initiatives against ISIS in Syria, it has not utilized
these same initiatives in its interactions with
Assad. “Inaction”, the word, which best describes
United States foreign policy regarding regime
change in Syria, cannot be used to describe the
majority of foreign policy initiatives of President
Trump. This inherent discrepancy between
Trump’s foreign policy regarding ISIS and the lack
of action taken to facilitate the deposition of
Assad, provokes a question into the cause of the
inconsistencies. While liberalism has been rejected
as the answer to understanding this discrepancy,
there must be another viable answer to
understanding this phenomenon. In light of this
rejection, this paper will turn towards isolating the
consistent variable in both President Obama and
Trump’s administrations.
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DETERMINING FACTOR
One of the consistent factors between both of the
Obama presidencies and the Trump presidency to
date, is public opinion regarding United States
intervention in Syria. During all three presidential
terms, a majority of the public opinion polls
indicated a strong resistance to military
intervention. These polls and charts will be
presented in order to analyze the correlation
between public opinion and the actions taken by
the United States military as well the effects on the
policies of the presidential administrations.
Much of the public opposition to military
intervention in Syria can be ascribed to the
previous wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the
height of the Syrian crisis, these past wars were still
fresh in the minds of American citizens, biasing
them against any actions of the United States
which could possibly lead to yet another war or
prolonged conflict (“The Syrian Dilemma”). “so
much of the aversion to intervention…has been
predicated on Syria’s supposed similarity to Iraq
and fear of entering into another quagmire” (“The
Syria Dilemma” 24). This constant fear in
Americans’ minds partially explains the
overwhelming opposition to any military
intervention in Syria. The mishaps and extended
stays in both Iraq and Afghanistan hurt the
public’s reliance on the U.S. government to
provide limited assistance without mass
deployment. Therefore, not only was the public
biased against small scale operations in Syria, but
the full-scale military invasion needed to facilitate
the deposition of Assad was completely off the
table.
The influence of public approval can be seen
in President Obama’s request for congressional
authorization to approve the airstrikes in Syria.
Mayer describes the power of the President as
commander-in-chief, and his ability to conduct
the airstrikes in Syria without asking for a formal
certification of approval (Mayer). She refers to
Obama’s action as “unprecedented” as “there are
no other instances of a President asking for
advance congressional approval for an attack of
this scale” (Mayer 827). This significant request by
the President further emphasizes the importance
he placed upon public and administrative approval
for military intervention in Syria. This request is

even more significant as during this time in the
Syrian conflict, the public was more intensely
biased against conducting strikes. In fact, The
Washington Post found that there were “263
House members against or leaning against, and
only 25 expressing public support” for the strikes,
while in the Senate the count was “23 in favor and
43 against or leaning against” (Mayer). This
overwhelming disapproval towards the strikes
accurately represents the American public’s
opposition to military intervention in Syria as well.
In response to Obama’s proposal for airstrikes he
stated that he was “also mindful that I’m the
president of the world’s oldest constitutional
democracy”, explaining the core liberal policies
which largely influenced his decisions and inaction
(Staff, Washington Post). This also explains his
reliance on Congressional approval instead of the
use of his executive power as commander-in-chief.
While President Obama could potentially have
ordered the military airstrikes on Syria without the
assent of the House or Senate, his devotion to the
democratic process led to his proposal to
Congress. This emphasis on democracy also
explains the subsequent hesitancy displayed by
President Obama in suggesting military
interference in Syria, as after the proposal failed,
Obama looked for alternative solutions to the
conflict.
The Brookings Institution published an
expansive survey regarding the American public’s
attitudes toward Syria, specifically focusing on
ISIS. The study was conducted with a sample of
1008 American adults in November of 2014,
during Obama’s second term (Telhami). Some of
the key findings of the surveys concluded that
Americans also perceived ISIS as the biggest threat
in the Middle East, and therefore the expected
forefront foreign policy issue of the U.S.
(Telhami). The survey also found that if the
airstrikes conducted by the international
community, including the United States, failed to
destroy ISIS, a majority of those polled would still
oppose deploying ground forces in Syria. The
graph below represents the poll results of the
question, showing that 57% of the sample size
opposed sending troops into Syria, with the
objective of fighting ISIS (Telhami). This specific
graph also shows the discrepancies between
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Republicans and Democrats with regard to
favoring or opposing military intervention.

Gallup, Inc.

The Brookings Institute

The survey asked follow-up questions
regarding military operations in Syria, and the
removal of the Assad regime. The Brookings
Institute found that Americans were ultimately
opposed to any military operations with “72%
opposing and 25% supporting such operations”
(Telhami). While there were strong anti-Assad
sentiments expressed throughout the questions,
both parties came to very similar conclusions
regarding United States military action.
Gallup conducted a public opinion poll in
September of 2013, asking questions related to
United States foreign policy, with a focus on the
Syrian conflict. The poll was taken among 1,038
American adults in all of the 50 states. The poll
followed President Obama’s speech regarding the
chemical weapons stockpiles in Syria, detailing
possible plans to supervise the Assad regime and
ensure the destruction of the chemical weapons
(“A Look at US Involvement in Syria.”). The
survey was conducted twice, within the span of a
week. Within this week, the survey found that the
public’s opposition to military strikes in Syria had
risen from “51%” to “62%” (Gallup, Inc). The
survey also found that the support for military
intervention in Syria dropped from “36% to 28%”
within that same week (Gallup, Inc).

This poll highlights the complicated nature of
the American public’s reactions and opinions
regarding the Syrian conflict. The public’s views
are both impressionable and dynamic as within a
week, support and opposition numbers fluctuated
in response to the unfolding events. However,
while fluctuation in inevitable, the poll highlights
the overwhelming opposition to military
intervention.
A poll conducted this past April by CBS News
surveyed 1,006 American adults concerning
Trump’s foreign policy in Syria (CBS News).
When asked “How far are you willing to see the
U.S. go in Syria” only 18% responded with ground
troops and a full-scale military invasion (CBS
News). While there was much more support
amongst those polled for airstrikes, when
compared to those polls presented previously
during Obama’s administration, there is not
overwhelming public support for military
involvement.
CBS News

Democratic involvement and representation is
emphasized in the next question presented by the
poll. When asked “Do you think it is necessary for
Congress to approve any further U.S. military
action in Syria, or do you think Donald Trump has
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the authority to take further military action in
Syria without getting approval of Congress?” the
results were as followed (CBS News).
CBS News

Seven in ten Americans underscore the
necessity for Trump to receive authorization from
Congress before pursuing further action in Syria
(CBS News). This poll indicates the American
public’s emphasis on representation of views and
the democratic process. While President Trump
has the power of commander-in-chief and can
potentially initiate attacks on Syria without the
approval of Congress or the public, Americans are
highly opposed to this option (CBS News).
Therefore, it is necessary for the president to rely
upon the public ratings for decisions in foreign
policy, as if Trump were to conduct attacks
without authorization, his public approval rating
would be greatly damaged. The American public
has succeeded in attributing a greater importance
to their opinions, as is seen through Obama’s
proceedings.
CONCLUSION
Throughout the Syrian conflict, United States
foreign policy has largely remained stagnant
regarding regime change. While there is evidence
of the United States’ goal of removing Assad from
power, there has been very little action taken to
reach this goal or facilitate the removal of Assad
from Syria’s presidency. Despite the
denouncement of the Assad regime at numerous
points in time throughout the Syrian conflict, the
examples of “action” taken by the U.S. are in the
form of rhetoric or empty promises. The U.S. has
failed to pursue any solid foreign policy plans

regarding the deposition of Assad, under both the
Obama and Trump administrations. The United
States’ influence and intervention in Syria has been
fixated on either the fight against terrorism and
ISIS or the conflict regarding chemical weapons.
While the U.S. has taken the initiative in certain
circumstances and sent military officials, troops,
and even conducted numerous airstrikes, the
extent of foreign policy plans stop there. The
intent to remove Assad has been in place since
Obama’s first presidential term, and regime
change remains possible, yet U.S. foreign policy to
date has proved ineffective in achieving regime
change.
The foreign policy theories of liberalism and
realism are inadequate answers to the question of
why the United States has failed to depose the
Assad regime despite the goal of Syrian regime
change. It is clear that many of President Obama’s
initiatives coincided with the foundational points
of liberalism, due to his identification as a liberal
non interventionist and his subscription to
liberalism. This subscription in seen through his
emphasis on diplomatic negotiations with the
Assad regime and the lack of military strikes
conducted in Syria. Liberalism can further explain
his hesitancy to facilitate regime change in Syria
due to the necessity to use power politics and rely
upon military strength, elements of the theory of
realism. While the influence of the theory of
liberalism is partially responsible for the lack of
military intervention in Syria during Obama’s
terms, liberalism cannot account for the inaction
during the Trump presidency. Therefore,
liberalism is rejected as the determining factor and
answer to the inaction of the United States in
deposing Assad from power in Syria.
Despite Trump’s subscription to realism and
his emphasis on power politics, the United States
has abandoned the promise to remove Assad.
Trump has not hesitated in using military force
against the Syrian regime in response to prolonged
chemical weapons attacks by the Assad
administration. Trump has also denounced
Assad’s actions and reiterated his interest in
punishing and reforming the Assad regime.
Despite, Trump’s emphasis on power and military
intervention, the Assad regime remains in the
same state as during Obama’s presidential terms.
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In fact, Trump’s failure to facilitate Syrian regime
change directly contrasts with his subscription to
realism. Therefore, both realism and liberalism
cannot completely account for the inaction
inherent in U.S. foreign policy towards Syria.
Due to the drastic difference in subscription to
theories of foreign policy between Obama’s
presidential terms and Trump’s presidency, the
common denominator between the two sheds light
on answering the overarching question of the
paper. The common factor between the
presidencies, and answer to the question of Syrian
regime change, is public opinion. While liberalism
and realism have shaped United States foreign
policy, the reason the U.S. has not pursued the
deposition of Assad, is due to the over-arching
effect of public opinion. Throughout the three
presidential terms, public opinion remains largely
opposed to large-scale military intervention in
Syria, including regime change. Obama and
Trump were both aware of the public opinions
regarding Syria, shaping their foreign policy plans
and their administration’s actions. Because public
polls repeatedly emphasized the hostility towards
military intervention, the idea of regime change in
and of itself was deemed implausible due to the
public outcry it would provoke. The publicity
surrounding the Syrian conflict from its
origination has made Assad’s regime a forefront
issue, one that both Obama and Trump have
recognized warrants extreme precision and care in
proceedings. The findings of this paper conclude
that public opinion is the determining factor in
explaining the United States inaction in pursuing
regime change in Syria, due to the majority public
opposition to regime change.
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